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ARTICLE
‘EU Justice Scoreboard: a new policy tool for “deepening”
European integration?’
Alexander Strelkov
Leiden University College, The Hague, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Since its introduction in late 2013, the EU Justice Scoreboard allows the
European Commission to obtain information on the performance of
national judicial systems. This article argues that despite being a techni-
cal policy instrument, the EU Justice Scoreboard has the long-term
potential to aﬀect the division of competences between member states
and supranational institutions in the domain of rule of law. Drawing on
three meta-theories of EU integration, neofunctionalism, new intergo-
vernmentalism and governance, this article investigates which theoreti-
cal approach best explains the functioning of this policy instrument.
Although it is considered that in the case of the EU Justice Scoreboard,
insights from both neofunctionalism and new intergovernmentalism
have better explanatory power, this article stresses the need to combine
various theoretical accounts for a more comprehensive understanding of
EU policy processes.
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Introduction
The creation of the EU Justice Scoreboard by the European Commission under consecutive leader-
ship of José Manuel Barroso and Jean Claude Juncker has added to the pool of EU policy
instruments in the domain of Justice and Home Aﬀairs. As a ‘soft governance’ tool for comparing
the quality of member states’ judicial systems and highlighting ‘best practices’ in the organization
of the judiciary, it aims at ensuring high eﬃciency of judicial proceedings across the EU territory
without directly enhancing supranational competences within the EU. Since 2013, the European
Commission has published six editions of the Scoreboard, stressing its importance not only for the
rule of law as such but also for securing a sound regulatory and investment-friendly environment
as well as upholding EU values (European Commission 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016).
In this article, we argue that the EU Justice Scoreboard can have important long-term conse-
quences for the ‘deepening’ of EU integration. On one hand, EU Justice Scoreboard is an instrument
which relies exclusively on peer pressure and voluntary provision of information by member states: It
does not directly alter the division of competences between supranational institutions and member
states. On the other hand, EU Justice Scoreboard sets an important precedent. Previously, the
European Commission got directly involved with national judicial systems only in cases of member
states’ non-compliance with acquis communautaire. With the introduction of the EU Justice
Scoreboard, the European Commission is able to provide an overview and give recommendations
about the routine working of national judicial systems, becoming closely involved in monitoring the
day-to-day administration of justice. Given that EU member states have always been reluctant to pool
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sovereignty in the domain of justice and home aﬀairs (Trauner and Ripoll Servent 2016), the fact that
they agreed to a form of external assessment of their judicial systems is puzzling. In the long term, the
European Commission’s involvement in the technical aspects of national judicial systems provides an
opportunity for the expansion of supranational competences, as has been in the case in other policy
domains (Pollack 2000b; Citi 2014b).
As provision of rule of law and justice remains one of the key prerogatives of EU member states,
the creation of EU Justice Scoreboard, ﬁrst, reopens the debate as to what is the optimal division of
labour between EU intergovernmental and supranational bodies in this policy domain (Carrera, Guild,
and Hernanz 2013) and, second, poses the question about the direction of European integration. Even
if some member states such as Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary have various challenges with
the rule of law and the quality of their judicial systems (Dinan 2017b), EU attempts to redress the
situation through monitoring and sanctioning have produced mixed results at best (Dimitrov,
Harlampiev, and Stoychev 2016b). Respective policy solutions face the challenge of combining
national sovereignty with external oversight of the rule of law, while securing accountability at the
same time – goals that are diﬃcult to accomplish simultaneously. Any of the policy solutions taken to
address the rule of law challenges and the quality of justice through involvement of the European
Commission will aﬀect the direction of EU integration as it is likely to reshape the division of
competences between supranational institutions and member states. Even if EU Justice Scoreboard
remains a very technical instrument, rule of law policies provide an important test-case for various
theoretical approaches to dynamics of EU integration (Trauner and Ripoll Servent 2018). The focus of
this article is not on the motivations of particular stakeholders to partake in the EU Justice Scoreboard
(this article does not aim to assess whether they are driven by rational or normative goals) but on
understanding how the functioning of the EU Justice Scoreboard can be explained by diﬀerent EU
integration theories. This article endeavours to test how three meta-theories of EU integration (new
intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and governance) assess the functioning of the EU Justice
Scoreboard, considering their explanatory value as well as shortcomings. These three accounts
provide diﬀerent assessments of the political dynamic of the EU and present alternative visions of
the EU Justice Scoreboard’s impact. For example, voluntary information-sharing and lack of suprana-
tional sanctions within the EU Justice Scoreboard clearly relate to intergovernmentalist accounts,
while the progressive expansion of European Commission’s remit to include criminal justice into the
policy instrument appeals to functionalist accounts. Governance accounts highlight the multilevel
nature of the EU political system and stress opportunities for building trust among actors that the EU
Justice Scoreboard oﬀers.
We propose that in its current form, the EU Justice Scoreboard is best assessed through a
synthesis of the above-mentioned approaches. This article draws on Haugton’s (2016) claim
about the urgency to reignite the debate on the drivers and destination of European integra-
tion, especially given the series of crises that the EU has been facing as well as the conceptual
challenges that they present. The comparison of various theoretical accounts is done on the
basis of what Blatter and Haverland (2012, 144) call congruence analysis: small N research
design where case studies are used ‘to provide empirical evidence for the explanatory relevance
or relative strength of one theoretical approach in contrast to other theoretical approaches’. In
doing so, this article draws on interviews conducted in November–December 2016 with various
actors (European Commission, European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), European
Parliament (EP), Council General Secretariat, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
stakeholders)1 which have been involved in the set-up and functioning of the EU Justice
Scoreboard.
EU Justice Scoreboard: setting the scene
The EU Justice Scoreboard is an information tool that has been set up by the European Commission
at the end of 2013. The underlying objective is to assist the EU and member states ‘to achieve more
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eﬀective justice’ through the provision of reliable and comparable data on the quality, indepen-
dence and eﬃciency of justice systems in all member states as well as uphold EU founding values.
The introduction of the EU Justice Scoreboard was presented by the EU Commissioner Viviane
Reding (2013) as an answer to the so-called Copenhagen dilemma, namely the insuﬃcient means
to control compliance of member states with the founding principles of the EU after accession.
Later, however, the European Commission’s rhetoric has changed. The EU Justice Scoreboard was
not presented as a tool to address systematic abuses of democratic and rule of law principles
across EU member states (Bogdany and Ioannidis 2014b). Rather, it has been framed as an integral
part of the European Semester, a set of measures to mitigate the consequences of the Eurozone
crisis. EU Justice Scoreboard links eﬀectiveness of justice with investment attractiveness and ability
to guarantee transparent business climate. Moreover, it is highlighted that EU Justice Scoreboard is
‘part of an open dialogue with member states to help them achieve more eﬀective justice systems’
(European Commission 2017a).
EU Justice Scoreboard does not rank judicial systems of member states in terms of performance,
does not envisage any sanctioning mechanisms and does not promote any particular ‘template’ of
organizing judicial institutions. Being a ‘soft governance’ tool, its added value lies in the provision of a
systematic long-term annual overview by collecting information on aspects of national judicial systems,
for example, caseload, length of court proceedings, anti-corruption measures and access to justice
among disadvantaged groups. At the end, no single ranking is created but rather a comparative
overview of how each national judicial system functions. Information is obtained from a variety of
sources: Council of Europe (CoE) Commission for the Evaluation of the Quality of Justice (CEPEJ), oﬃcials
from national judiciaries and ministries of justice, Eurostat and a host of other stakeholders. Member
states may receive speciﬁc recommendations about their judicial systems, yet these are always framed
as part of the European Semester, not as ‘independent’ EU Justice Scoreboard recommendations.
Theoretical approaches and propositions
The functioning of the EU Justice Scoreboard is considered from the point of view of three grand
meta-theories of EU integration – neofunctionalism (Niemann and Ioannou 2015b), new intergo-
vernmentalism (Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015b)2 and (multilevel) governance (Pagoulatos
and Tsoukalis 2012b). These approaches have been selected as they highlight the issue of the
ﬁnalité of EU integration and the interplay of diﬀerent levels of competence within the EU political
system. This article highlights the key propositions of each theoretical approach broadly deﬁned
rather than deals with the subbranches of each theoretical conﬁguration. Diﬀerent theoretical
approaches are not considered to be mutually exclusive: A number of EU integration studies
(Haughton 2016b; Jones, Keleman, and Meunier 2016b; Saurugger 2016b) have convincingly
shown that combining diﬀerent theoretical accounts provides a more comprehensive and realistic
assessment of the policy process. An important point is that ‘theories are not reduced to single
independent variables but are treated as comprehensive worldviews that are speciﬁed through a
set of constitutive and causal propositions’ (Blatter and Haverland 2012b, 24). Nevertheless, this
article endeavours to ﬁnd the best match between the three theoretical accounts and the empirical
reality of EU Justice Scoreboard functioning through congruence analysis. Table 1 presents the key
parameters of each theoretical approach as well as formulates a number of propositions about how
each approach would address the functioning of the EU Justice Scoreboard.
New intergovernmentalism
New intergovernmentalism (Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter 2015b; Pollack 2012b) considers mem-
ber states as drivers of the integration process. This approach aims to address the paradox of
member states pursuing the process of integration without signiﬁcant and lasting transfers of
decision-making power, something that liberal intergovernmentalism allegedly fails to account for.
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Through focusing on the norms of consensus and deliberation as well as creation of ‘de novo
institutions’3 in a context where distinction between high and low politics is blurred, member
states continue to be in charge of the integration agenda.
A new intergovernmentalist reading of the Justice Scoreboard would imply that
● Member states will retain control over the operational aspects of the EU Justice Scoreboard;
● EU Justice Scoreboard will be limited to monitoring of member states judicial systems and will
have no independent sanctioning capacity;
● Although EU Justice Scoreboard is based on information-sharing and deliberation, it will not
lead to any shift of loyalties or ideational transformation of member states.
Neofunctionalism
The neofunctionalist account (Sandholz and Sweet 2012b) focuses on the notion of spillover, the
spread of EU competences from one policy ﬁeld to the other. In the case of the EU Justice
Scoreboard, it can be argued that there is a functional spillover (Niemann and Ioannou 2015b):
Objectives of developing a single market cannot be obtained without further integrative action in
the judicial sector. The neofunctionalist account would stress that member states would not be
able to limit and control the scope of the EU Justice Scoreboard as actors involved in its
implementation will develop their own agenda and will attempt to expand its scope. A number
of propositions can be formulated:
● Supranational institutions (EP and European Commission) will be interested in enhancing the
scope and range of competences related to the EU Justice Scoreboard;
● Supranational institutions will strive for greater independence from member states in exercis-
ing tasks related to the EU Justice Scoreboard;
● EU level/supranational level becomes a ‘reference point’ for stakeholders in the policy sector
Governance accounts
Governance accounts (Pagoulatos and Tsoukalis 2012b) highlight the multilevel nature of the EU
political system: Actors ‘move’ between national and supranational levels of the system, searching
for the optimal venue to pursue their interests and ‘strategically using Europe’ (Woll and Jacquot
2010b). Although Schakel (2016b) highlights that multilevel governance approaches do not pro-
vide immediate hypotheses about the behaviour of actors, we can formulate a number of
assumptions about how governance accounts take stock of the EU Justice Scoreboard:
● NGOs as well as key sectoral stakeholders will proactively address the European Commission
and be interested in the expansion of its remit;
Table 1. Theoretical approaches to EU integration.
Neofunctionalism (New) intergovernmentalism Governance
Key actors Supranational institutions Member states NGOs and sectoral stakeholders at both
national and international levels
Preferences Enhancing the ‘depth and
breadth’ of integration
through spillover
Retaining control of the integration
process as a precondition for
collaboration in new policy domains
Third parties and stakeholders move
between national and supranational
levels to maximize their beneﬁts
Ideational
change
New supranational
loyalties
No/limited New loyalties/building trust
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● NGOs, national and supranational stakeholders in the rule of law domain will try to promote
their policy preferences on the organization of the judicial sector within the EU Justice
Scoreboard process;
● Deliberation and dialogue that are central to the EU Justice Scoreboard would lead to
ideational change and growing mutual trust due to the non-hierarchical, non-coercive nature
of this policy instrument.
Key actors
Along the lines of a new intergovernmentalist approach, member states are ‘gatekeepers’ of the EU
Justice Scoreboard, any changes in its scope or competences have to be agreed by them. A
respondent from the EP (A1) illustrates this point:
For me personally the most logical step would be to revise the mandate of the Fundamental Rights Agency . . .
The problem is that for the sake of political compromise we had to drop this idea because we realised that
actually any developments that would require some legislative changes is a no-go for the Council, at least for
the time being.
Member states also remain ‘gatekeepers’ in the process of information provision. For example, a
representative of the European Commission (A6) mentions that it is the member states who decide
who exactly is going to be the interlocutor of the Commission’s oﬃcials. Commission requests for
meetings are sent through a Permanent Representation and subsequently member states decide
who will be in touch: The European Commission cannot directly approach a national ministry of
justice. A representative of a stakeholder involved in the EU Justice Scoreboard (A7) conﬁrms the
‘gatekeeping’ function of member states: ‘Commission cannot go beyond the member states if
they want to have these kinds of meetings with national contact points’. Moreover, the members of
the above-mentioned group of contact persons on national justice systems are nominated by
national administrations, not chosen by the Commission (Dori 2015b; European Commission
2017a). Any rotation that happens within the group is the result of internal change in national
ministries, not any exogenous pressure, explains a representative of the European
Commission (A6a).
Nevertheless, one can make an argument against presenting member states as key actors in the
development of the EU Justice Scoreboard. Namely, member states do not seem to be preoccupied
with the EU Justice Scoreboard. A representative of the Council General Secretariat mentions that
the ﬁrst and last time the EU Justice Scoreboard was discussed dates back to 2014 (A8), while a
stakeholder deeply involved in the EU Justice Scoreboard process says that ‘the Council does not
know it exists’ (A7). Representatives of the Commission (A6) also conﬁrm that the Council discussed
the EU Justice Scoreboard only once (Council of the European Union 2014b), when the instrument
was introduced, ‘now it is not on the radar any more’. This alleged lack of attention by the member
states does not correspond well with inbuilt tabs on Commission’s autonomy in developing and
potentially expanding the EU Justice Scorecard, as a new intergovernmentalist approach would
suggest. At the same, the alleged lack of member states’ interest in the EU Justice Scoreboard does
not imply that it is unimportant: Other EU policy actors – namely the EP as well as several NGOs –
see it as an opportunity to expand EU’s oversight and presence in the rule of law sector. The
functioning of the EU Justice Scoreboard can be presented as a case of ‘unintended consequences’
of member states coordination, agents of member states escaping their individual or collective
control, – all these arguments supporting a neofunctionalist, rather than new intergovernmentalist
account.
Following a governance approach that stresses the multilevel character of the European polity,
it could be argued that through the EU Justice Scoreboard, the European Commission develops
extensive network ties with a large number of actors (European Commission for the Eﬃciency of
Justice/CEPEJ, Venice Committee, European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), etc.), not
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only allowing them to gather information and obtain leverage in a non-hierarchical manner
(Coman 2016b) but also giving them a voice in the EU political setting. As the EU Justice
Scoreboard is heavily dependent on these networks for information provision, NGOs and sectoral
stakeholders become one of the key players in this policy setting. Nevertheless, what the govern-
ance approach does not take into account is that the responsibility to uphold the rule of law is
shared between national governments and EU institutions, not sectoral stakeholders. The actual
design and functioning of the EU Justice Scoreboard is the result of negotiations over the division
of competences, and the governance approach does not help account for them. As one of the
interviewees (A7) puts is, ‘you can measure the number of trainings but whether someone who
took part in trainings has actually learned something – it is another issue’. Other involved parties
share this conviction: ‘ﬁgures alone don’t prove anything’ (A4), ‘if you do only numbers, it can be
misleading’ (A8). Even if the ﬁgures presented in the EU Justice Scoreboard are not contentious, the
interpretation of such rule of law indicators is wrought with conﬂict (Ginsburg 2011b). Interestingly,
interviews (A6) show that although various CoE bodies and NGOs are involved in providing
information to the European Commission for the development of the EU Justice Scoreboard,
these interactions have not necessarily been formalized, embedded into a regular policy cycle
and often happen in an ad hoc manner. It is more often the case that the European Commission
approaches sectoral stakeholders, NGOs and CoE bodies, not the other way around.
Ultimately, even if there is no denial of sectoral actors’ involvement in the policy process of the
EU Justice Scoreboard, its functioning hinges on the relationship between member states and
supranational bodies. Member states may be disinterested, yet they remain authoritative ‘gate-
keepers’ that can veto any expansion of the Justice Scoreboard’s remit, while technical work has
been formally delegated to supranational bodies.
Preferences
At ﬁrst glance, the creation of the EU Justice Scoreboard neatly ﬁts the so-called integration
paradox that new intergovernmentalism professes. Member states want to pursue integration
but do it outside of the ‘straightjacket’ of the Community method: They cannot aﬀord to ignore
problems with the rule of law, but they create weak mechanisms with little coercive power out of
fear of endangering their sovereignty. Hence, delegation takes place not to supranational institu-
tions but to ‘de novo’ bodies that are less autonomous. In fact, the European Commission does not
have the powers to independently monitor, assess and enforce the rule of law. Not only is it
deprived of any sanctioning powers, it is highly reliant on third parties to obtain information which
it cannot gather independently. Some member states often do not provide all information that is
gathered within the framework of the EU Justice Scoreboard, limiting its monitoring capacity.4 This
means that member states limit potential interference of the EU into their judicial systems.
Moreover, there is a certain self-limitation of the European Commission in terms of using and
assessing the wider implications of the EU Justice Scoreboard. Respondents from the Commission
have stressed that it is not an instrument to address the ‘Copenhagen dilemma’, potential demo-
cratic backsliding of member states. For example, ‘the EU Justice Scoreboard is established as an
information tool and hopefully will stay short and distilled. It is 50 pages or so, not bloated. If we
want to include something else, we need to get rid of something’, argues a representative of the
European Commission (A3). This illustrates that Commission anticipates a negative reaction from
member states about any expansion of EU Justice Scoreboard scope, supporting an intergovern-
metalist interpretation.
However, the introduction of the EU Justice Scoreboard can be considered as an example of
a spillover, the functional pressure created by the attempts to address the ‘Copenhagen
dilemma’ (Coman 2014b) or secure quality of judicial procedures for the sake of buttressing
the single market. In comparison to a situation of late 2000s when ‘there was no one in the
Commission with this portfolio, no one thought about horizontal issues in the justice sector’
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(A7), the creation of the EU Justice Scoreboard is a major success in ﬂagging up this new issue
on the EU agenda. The logic of the spillover would imply that the decline of rule of law in a
member state creates negative externalities for other states. The incomplete character of
integration creates risks for member states and provides opportunities for supranational actors
to expand their leverage.
The EP, for example, clearly wants to increase the scope and leverage of the Justice Scoreboard:
Although EP political groups have diﬀerent views concerning the desirability of stronger EU
oversight in the rule of law sector, there is a broad agreement that rule of law deﬁciencies in
member states have to be addressed. An interviewee from the EP (A1) expands on this: ‘The
parliament treated the EU Justice Scoreboard as one of the steps in the positive direction but not
necessarily the ﬁnal step, it was just the ﬁrst step’. Moreover, the October 2016 report by Sophia in
’t Veld (ALDE) argues the that EU Justice Scoreboard should be incorporated into the EU pact on
democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights (EP 2016); she stresses yet again that criminal justice
should also be included in the Scoreboard.
Nevertheless, the neofunctionalist account that focuses on the ‘spillover’ of supranational
preferences has its limitations. For example, the level of spillover remains limited: Although the
EP intensively lobbies to include criminal justice into the Scoreboard, it still predominantly applies
to civil, administrative and commercial law cases. ‘This is one of the ﬁrst samples of having a
permanent monitoring situation and gradually expanding this monitoring’, mentions a staﬀ mem-
ber of the EP (A1). Basically, from the very introduction of this policy instrument the EP wanted to
expand its scope but was not successful, no further spillover has taken place. A staﬀ member of the
EP (A9) summarizes the situation in following terms:
Council is playing ostrich policies, waits until it comes to boil. There is no collective capacity to deal with it (rule
of law challenges – authors) on a systematic level. On the positive side, however, some time ago such a
dialogue would not have been possible at all
As an interviewee from the EP mentions (A2), the EP has not speciﬁed how exactly it suggests
including criminal law in the EU Justice Scoreboard, although there are several distinct approaches.
This gives the European Commission somewhat of cart blanche on deﬁning the speciﬁc method.
However, contrary to the neofunctionalist account, it is actually very cautious for a ‘expansionist’
interpretation of the EU Justice Scoreboard, potentially anticipating resistance from member states.
For example, mentions a representative of a stakeholder (A4), introducing criminal law to the EU
Justice Scoreboard through data on time spent in custody or alternative modes of punishment are
relatively uncontroversial, and member states could potentially agree to this. However, data on
reasons for incarceration, for example, are politically sensitive and technically complicated as not all
EU member states have identical deﬁnitions and categories of criminal oﬀences. Representative of
the European Commission (A6) points out similar challenges with introducing criminal law to the
EU Justice Scoreboard:
One aspect is the political context, another one is the availability of data, another – how do you deﬁne criminal
justice? We are exploring the availability of data and this is the most diﬃcult one. If only some member states
are going to provide data we are not going to include it (criminal law – author)
However, in the 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard, some initial reference to criminal justice was done –
through providing information on case proceedings in money laundering. If one assumes that the
introduction of the EU Justice Scoreboard is the result of ‘spillover’, then it is surprising that
supranational institutions which are considered to push for the expansion of EU competences
have diﬀerent views on the matter and do not coordinate their actions. For example, even when
consultations between the Council and the European Commission on the EU Justice Scoreboard
have taken place, EP representatives have never been invited, argues one of the interviewees (A1).
The same situation repeats itself with any follow-ups to the recommendations from the EU Justice
Scoreboard – the EP is not involved, mentions an interviewee (A1):
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We have not had any exchange with the Council or the Commission, structural exchange I mean, for example
reports of the Council, follow-ups to the recommendation etc. So I would say that the Council relies on the
Commission to follow up on this and to indicate if there are any problems in this context.
Another example is that the European Commission has also been very cautious in reacting to the
EP’s proposal on the creation of the EU mechanism on democracy, which also implied embedding
the EU Justice Scoreboard in a more ambitious framework (European Commission 2017b).
Interestingly, interviewees highlight that even if the EP aims at increasing the scope of the EU
Justice Scoreboard, it does not have a clear policy plan. There are concerns about the ability of
members of the EP to actually use EU Justice Scoreboard in daily work: ‘this is a very useful tool for
experts but not so much for the politicians’, argues a staﬀ member of the EP (A1). It is also
mentioned that despite the Scoreboard’s connection to the European Semester, it is still diﬀerent
groups of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who address economic and rule of law
issues, limiting potential use of this policy instrument and any purported spillover eﬀect (A1, A2).5
Ultimately, along the lines of a neofunctionalist explanation, agents should deviate from the
preferences of principals. However, the European Commission seems to be less willing to ‘deviate’
in comparison to the EP. The latter, even pushing for the expansion of EU Justice Scoreboard, may
ﬁnd it diﬃcult to explore its potential due to the technical complexity of interpreting and using the
data. Spillover does not automatically translate into capacity to act: Even if neofunctionalist
preferences exist, there are not necessarily articulated into political practice.
The governance approach would expect non-governmental actors to exploit various ‘venues’ of
the EU political system to address their goals. In case of the EU Justice Scoreboard, the picture is
mixed. On one hand, experts (Dallara and Piana 2015b) highlight that judicial networks are
becoming increasingly important in reforming the rule of law sector, for example, through provid-
ing information and training. On the other hand, it has been highlighted that stakeholders in the
judicial sector do not share the same vision on the involvement of a centralized Commission
authority or new mechanisms of supranational judicial supervision (Coman 2016b).
Contrary to the expectations of the governance approach, staﬀ members of the European
Commission (A3) and stakeholders (A5) argue that in practice, interactions between the
European Commission and NGOs relate purely to information gathering, not to deliberation or
promotion of speciﬁc policy solutions. Another interviewee (A9) provides another example: Even
during information exchange, the Commission and, for example, CEPEJ do not collaborate on
developing a common pool of data, Commission just takes the information that is available from
CEPEJ. In other words, currently, there are no instances when the preparation of the EU Justice
Scoreboard has been used as a focal point to promote distinct agendas of policy actors. In fact, at
times, NGOs and stakeholders in the judicial sector are weary of the European Commission’s
involvement. A staﬀ member of the EP (A2) illustrates this point:
The Commission can draw on CEPEJ, Council of Europe bodies but it is never clear how the competences are
divided. Council of Europe was reluctant to cooperate at times. Cooperation was taking place but there was a
sense that the Commission started playing on the turf of Council of Europe . . . This was not about policy
solutions but about the division of competences. Previously Council of Europe was the key authority on the
rule of law in Europe, now the EU starts to address this issue as well.
Other interviewees also allude to tensions during the information gathering process (A4, A5). An
interesting example is presented by one of the stakeholders (A4):
CEPEJ was contacted by the Commission. For CEPEJ this was a commercial transaction, cash for data. It was
happy to make it available for anyone, there was no problem in providing it. Council of Europe feared that the
Commission will rank performance of countries, something that it does not do. For CEPEJ it was up to the
European Commission what they do with the data. If they did not provide this data – someone else would.
The Council General Secretariat is also aware of this debate, questioning whether CEPEJ data can
be easily summarized or reframed by the European Commission and stressing that it may lead to
subjective assessment (A8). Ultimately, in the case of EU Justice Scoreboard, involvement of actors
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from various levels of the multilevel system of the EU relates more to turf battles rather than
promotion of speciﬁc policy solutions. While looking at the preferences of key actors, it seems that
the new intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist accounts provide a better account of the EU
Justice Scoreboard. Nevertheless, in the absence of full-scale support of both European
Commission and EP for expanding the scope of the Justice Scoreboard, the account provided by
new intergovernmentalism is a more credible one.
Ideational change6
Theoretically, the non-binding character of the EU Justice Scoreboard, coupled with its focus on de-
politicized peer assessment7 and benchmarking, could potentially help enhance trust between EU
institutions and member states, making the policy instrument more acceptable to all involved
parties. This is a key component that is largely lacking in both intergovernmental and functionalist
explanations.
Interview data show that while a ‘normative spillover’, treating EU level as a ‘reference point’ for
the judicial sector is highly unlikely, one can argue about a slow attitude change of key stake-
holders in the sector, something what new intergovernmentalist accounts would not necessarily
consider. Nevertheless, interviews do not provide a ‘smoking gun evidence’ that would support
either of the theoretical accounts.
Many interviewees highlight that even if policy leverage of the EU Justice Scoreboard is
currently limited, de facto it promotes mutual recognition of judicial decisions. For example, a
stakeholder (A7) argues that the ‘Justice Scoreboard gave insights into how other judicial systems
work across Europe; before that there was nothing. This builds conﬁdence’. A staﬀ member of the
EP (A10) argues along the same lines, mentioning that ‘trust and credibility of data exchange
between legal professionals is essential for mutual recognition of judicial decisions’. Staﬀ members
of the Commission (A3) also highlight the capacity of the instrument to build trust because ‘it is not
saying who is a good one and who is a bad one but developing a system that provides for good
results’. Nevertheless, trust can remain problematic in case data are not reliable. The Commission
and other stakeholders have no inﬂuence over the quality of data that are provided by national
authorities, and occasionally, this has led to discrepancies and tensions between stakeholders,
allude both interviewees (A4) and secondary sources (Dori 2015b).
Even if trust-building is a long-term process, the EU Justice Scoreboard shapes the agenda of
the EU and changes the understanding of EU member states about the rule of law sector. In fact,
interviewees (A1, A2) argue that without such attitudinal change, no expansion of the Scoreboard’s
remit is possible. According to a staﬀ member of the European Commission (A6), the EU Justice
Scoreboard has captured the attention of legal professionals and policymakers: It appears in
domestic policy debates, it is referred to in the opinion of highest judicial authorities of some
member states, it ﬁgures in publications of journalists writing about judicial matters. A staﬀ
member of the FRA (A5) elucidates on the Justice Scoreboard’s capacity to raise awareness:
From several hundred pages of the CEPEJ report, the EU Justice Scoreboard is down to 30-40 pages. You
cannot hide deﬁciencies in a 30-page report, while in the CEPEJ report things get easily lost. Justice Scoreboard
reports become sensitive now – they highlight things with which some member states are not so comfortable.
It has to be noted that even if the EU Justice Scoreboard can in the long term generate trust
between actors in the judicial domain, contrary to the expectations of the governance approach, it
has not helped engage actors in the debate about the optimal solutions for judicial reform within
the EU. Arguably, ideational changes experienced by EU institutions, member states and stake-
holders do not necessarily translate it into cohesive policy preferences. Héritier (2013b) oﬀers a
potential explanation of why this is the case. ‘Soft governance’ tools in general – and EU Justice
Scoreboard in particular – have little coercive power and are dependent on voluntary cooperation.
Such instruments have a limited potential to promote convergence when the preferences of all
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involved parties vary signiﬁcantly, as is the case in the rule of law domain. Hence, even if the EU
Justice Scoreboard helps develop a common understanding that rule of law challenges do exist, it
has few means to secure a majority for a particular policy solution, for example, greater EU
oversight of the rule of law sector. Moreover, even if all EU member states, institutions and
stakeholders agree on the need to address rule of law challenges and conduct reforms that
enhance independence of the judiciary as well as the quality of justice, they are likely to have
diﬀerent policy solutions.
Ultimately, available data do not allow us to tell that there is an ‘ideational spillover’, as neo-
functionalists would suggest. In accordance with the governance approach, the non-hierarchical,
deliberative elements of the EU Justice Scoreboard can help generate trust, yet the policy implica-
tions of this process remain unclear. A new intergovernmentalist account would actually highlight
that deliberation does not necessarily lead to ideational change, yet one cannot disregard the fact
that the introduction of the EU Justice Scoreboard has moved the borders of ‘acceptable’ topics
within the EU and raised awareness of important issues.
Conclusion
The EU Justice Scoreboard is a ‘soft governance’ tool that allows information exchange and sharing
‘best practices’ in the rule of law sector. As an interview from the EP (A10) succinctly puts it, the EU
Justice Scoreboard is ‘a tool for comparing judicial systems without any idea that it should lead to
new rules and guidelines. It can go either way’. Diﬀerent theoretical perspectives provide alter-
native views on key participants, their preferences as well as the extent of the ideational change
that the EU Justice Scoreboard entails. Comparing these various theoretical accounts allows one to
better grasp the functioning of EU Justice Scoreboard and its potential impact within the EU
political system.
In terms of key actors, the EU Justice Scoreboard is primarily an interaction between member
states and supranational bodies. Stakeholders and NGOs in the rule of law sector do play a role, yet
they are not ‘veto players’. Member states can block further expansion of the Justice Scoreboard
competence, even if the initial decision to introduce the policy instrument was framed and
presented as the initiative of the European Commission. Even if EU member states endorse the
need for further information-sharing and collaboration in the rule of law sector, they remain the
actual ‘gatekeepers’. Hence, a new intergovernmentalist approach is the most adequate approach
if one looks at the key actors.
Looking at the preferences, there are strong arguments in favour of both new intergovernmen-
talist and neofunctionalist accounts. On one hand, the policy instrument can be legitimately
considered as an example spillover, expansion of EU tasks across new policy domains. On the
other hand, member states resist the expansion of the Justice Scoreboard’s remit and supranational
institutions adjust their policies accordingly. Moreover, not all supranational institutions are willing
to support the expansion of EU competencies in the rule of law sector. Yet, even if there is currently
no conﬂict over the functioning of the EU Justice Scoreboard, intergovernmental and supranational
institutions have distinct ‘ideal points’ as to how such policy should evolve. Interestingly, sectoral
stakeholders are currently not using the EU Justice Scoreboard to elaborate and push for their
policy preferences. This goes against the expectations of the multilevel governance approach that
highlights the ability and willingness of stakeholders to move between policy venues in search of
maximizing their policy preferences.
Addressing ideational change within the EU Justice Scoreboard, it can be argued that even if
the supranational level does not become the ‘normative reference point’ for dealing with the
rule of law sector, there is potential for long-term attitude change through building trust and
becoming aware of the various national practices. At the moment, however, increased trust
among the participants of the EU Justice Scoreboard does not translate into particular policy
choices.
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The reﬂection on key actors, their preferences and potential ideational change within the EU
Justice Scoreboard shows that no single theoretical account is able to provide a full comprehensive
account of the process. While new intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism best explain the
framework and the scope of EU Justice’s Scoreboard application, the governance approach high-
lights potential long-term impact of this policy instrument. Given the fact that EU supranational
bodies have used seemingly low-key, technical policy instruments to progressively expand their
competences, it is possible to argue that the EU Justice Scoreboard has the long-term potential to
‘deepen’ EU integration. At minimum, it makes it acceptable to address technicalities of the rule of
law sector at the EU level. Although member states agree to the necessity of the Scoreboard and
tolerate it, any major expansion of its competences will be resisted while supranational bodies are
not univocally willing to lobby for such policy change. Such a combination of theoretical accounts
may hinder one’s ability to provide a parsimonious argument, yet it also allows to see interesting
parallels between the EU Justice Scoreboard and other policy instruments. For example, it can be
argued that systemic challenges to the rule of law create functional pressure to ‘deepen’ EU
integration in the rule of law sector, yet the speciﬁc instruments and technical solutions to this
challenge are largely negotiated under member states control. This pattern is applicable not only
to the EU policies in the rule of law sector but also to measures taken to address the Eurozone
crisis. Contributions by Vilpisauskas (2013b) as well as Jones, Keleman and Meunier (2016b) high-
light a similar pattern: ‘spillover eﬀect’ in the economic sector requires pro-integration policy
solutions, yet these are negotiated largely within an intergovernmental format. This results in
what the abovementioned authors call a ‘failing forward dynamic’: Existing challenges are
addressed in an intergovernmental mode along the principle of lowest common denominator,
which is not suﬃcient, triggering another round of limited reforms and subsequent policy failure.
It is likely that the EU involvement in the rule of law sector could experience the same dynamic.
Above all, the ‘failing forward dynamic’ (be it in the economic or rule of law sector) is clearly not
sustainable in the long run as it negatively aﬀects public trust. However, the EU Justice Scoreboards
of 2016 and 2017 (European Commission 2016, 2017a) make explicit reference to Eurobarometer
data and surveys on the perceived independence of the judiciary, something what was not done in
the previous versions of the document. The fact that the European Commission presents the EU
Justice Scoreboard as a response to real and signiﬁcant grievances of the public may imply that the
‘failing forward dynamic’ can be stopped. Further research on EU involvement in the rule of law
sector should assess how instruments such as EU Justice Scoreboard behave in a ‘postfunctionalist
moment’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009), how (if at all) it interacts with mass politics as theoretical
accounts addressed in this article do not comprehensively take this factor into account. In any case,
potential policy consequences of the EU Justice Scoreboard call for a continuous debate and ﬁne-
tuning of theories of European integration, not just theorizing EU disintegration (Vollard 2012b).
Notes
1. Staﬀ members of Permanent Representations in Brussels have not been interviewed as during ﬁeldwork, it
became clear that they act almost exclusively as a conduit for information requests by the European
Commission.
2. This article selects new intergovernmentalism (rather than liberal intergovernmentalism) as it provides a more
nuanced rendition of integration dynamics while still highlighting the crucial role of member states in the
integration process. For an alternative opinion, see Schimmelfennig (2015b) and Haughton (2016b).
3. Various agencies and bodies with neither predominantly intergovernmental nor supranational features.
4. In some case, for example, Netherlands, speciﬁc types of data are unavailable because they are not routinely
gathered by national authorities.
5. The interviewees have also mentioned that there does not exist any regular technical coordination between
the European Commission and the European Parliament (EP) while the Justice Scoreboard is prepared.
Interviewees have also highlighted that beyond members of Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers
(DG JUST), there is no EU Commission staﬀ that regularly deals with EU Justice Scoreboard. It is likely that
expertise with this policy instrument is highly ‘compartmentalized’ within both Commission and the EP.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN STUDIES 11
6. The article does not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of ideational change as experienced by actors
in the judicial policy domain and, hence, does not adopt survey methodology. Given that a relatively limited
number of EU oﬃcials are directly involved in the set-up of the EU Justice Scoreboard, interviews are gauged
as a useful tool to provide preliminary insights.
7. The European Commission prefers not to use the term ‘peer-review’ in relation to the EU Justice Scoreboard
because, in its opinion, it misleadingly connects the policy instrument to Article 70 of Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
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